In this work, the threats to TESLA and the TESLA keychain are evaluated and the weak points in the implementation are identified. Modes of attack are modeled to emulate the effort required for an attacker to break the security of the TESLA keychain. This effort is contextualized with the window of vulnerability which is directly related to the length of the keychain and other variables. The effort required to break TESLA as these variables change is calculated using probabilistic models. While observing the variables' consequences to security, an analysis is carried out that yield recommendations for a secure implementation of the TESLA keychain.
I: Introduction
The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is used worldwide to provide accurate location and timing services to billions of users. In addition to its popular use in cell phones, GNSS is also relied upon in aviation and other critical infrastructure such as power grids and financial transactions. According to the department of Homeland Security, of the 18 critical infrastructure and key resources sectors in the United States, 15 rely upon on GNSS. The ubiquity of use, combined with the low signal power and predictable message structure, make GNSS signals susceptible to jamming and spoofing. Whether intentional or not, spoofing of GNSS signals poses a very real threat to all users. Many methods are being developed to mitigate and detect spoofing attacks as there is no "silver bullet" against spoof attacks and different combinations of these methods are likely to be used on different platforms. Some methods focus on the use of monitoring metrics within the receiver [1] , additional measurements taken from independent instruments such as IMUs [2] , and authentication of the spreading code [3] . The methods that are focused upon in this research are cryptographic methods that will soon be implemented on the European constellation Galileo and may be implemented on Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) and other GNSS signals in the future. Cryptography in the form of digital authentication will be implemented to protect GNSS data and can serve to mitigate many simple spoofing attacks available to adversaries today.
One algorithm that has been given considerable attention is the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Algorithm (TESLA) [4] . Small signature length, high security, and robustness to quantum computing attacks make it an ideal candidate for SBAS authentication. TESLA's security relies on a "keychain" that is derived using a one-way function, in this case a secure hash function SHA-256. The common way to denote this function is ℎ( ) = where ℎ is the hashing function, is the input value and is the output. This oneway function is pre-image resistant, meaning there is no easy way to compute ℎ −1 ( ) = . This one-way function is also collision resistant, meaning there is no easy way to find * where * ≠ , such that ℎ( * ) = ℎ( ) = . The security of these hash functions can be compared using a metric known as the security level. This metric serves as a common reference for different cryptographic schemes and represents the effort required to break these schemes. Keys from the TESLA keychain have a limited window of time in which they are valid. This introduces a key feature when incorporating cryptography in GNSS signals: the signals are only vulnerable for only a short period of time. Whereas a low security level might be disadvantageous for information that is valid for long periods of time, low security levels for a GNSS signal may be tolerable if the window of vulnerability is similarly small.
There are several variables that can significantly alter an attackers ability to discover a keychain. The length of the keychain, , can change the number of opportunities an attacker has to collide their keychain with the true keychain as well as change the total number of hash functions an attacker must compute to find a collision. The key length, , can exponentially change the probability of collision. The time between authentication (TBA) and time between key release can also change the frequency of how often a new keychain must be introduced. These parameters are constrained by bandwidth of the signal and the computing power of the receivers. The best design of the TESLA keychain will take these different factors into account in order to find the pareto optimum between security, bandwidth, and user effort.
This paper is divided into the following sections: Section II provides an overview of the TESLA algorithm; Section III briefly introduces the probabilistic model for TESLA security from [5] and derives an updated version of the attacker model; Section IV covers the trade space for the TESLA keychain design that is within the scope of this paper; Section V provides results and Section VI provides conclusions and recommendations from the trade space analysis.
II: The TESLA Algorithm
One proposed method of mitigating and detecting spoofing attacks is incorporating an authentication message type in addition to the current SBAS messages. This message would provide the user with the ability to determine whether the messages received by the receiver were valid messages that originated from the SBAS satellites. Currently, a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) appends the messages and allows the user to determine whether the message received has any errors, but this CRC does not verify the origin of the message itself. If a spoofer wished to attack the SBAS signal with synthetic messages made by the attacker, the CRC for those messages could still be pre-computed and sent along with the false message.
Authentication, on the other hand, strives to provide the user with a signature on the message that can only originate from the valid sender. This is accomplished in cryptography with the use of hard mathematical problems. There are two types of cryptographic systems: symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric systems require both the sender and receiver to share a secret key. With this secret key they are able to encrypt and send messages. Only those with a valid secret key are able to decrypt the messages and read the plaintext content. Asymmetric algorithms make use of a public key, secret key architecture. The sender is the only one in possession of the secret key, but instead of encrypting messages, the sender creates a signature of the message and sends the signature appended with the plaintext message. The receiver then uses the received message, signature and the public key to verify the authenticity of the message. Figure 1 shows both processes. As SBAS is a widely used system and the problems with keeping secret keys secure among all users are insurmountable, authentication using asymmetric methods are the most applicable in this case. An outline of TESLA is given in [6] and the basics of the method are covered here. TESLA is a symmetric cryptographic algorithm that creates asymmetry by the delayed release of keys used to authenticate signatures called Message Authentication Codes (MACs). A message is sent appended with the MAC that authenticates it, or a series of messages. After a period of time, the key is sent to "unlock" the MAC and verify the contents of the message(s) it authenticates. The main advantage for using TESLA as an authentication algorithm for SBAS is that it is computationally more efficient than other asymmetric algorithms which is important for receivers using low power, low speed embedded processing architectures. Similar to Figure 1 , Figure 2 shows the basic architecture of TESLA.
Since TESLA is a symmetric algorithm, anyone with the correct key could generate their own message and corresponding MAC in an attempt to spoof GNSS data. Because of this, the key that is released must also be authenticated and so is a part of a keychain, created by a one-way function released in the order opposite from which it was created. A keychain, shown in Figure 3 , is generated using one-way functions recursively, shown in Figure 4 , where the subscript denotes the index of the key and hash function used and 0 is the root key. There must be a separate, truly asymmetric algorithm that authenticates 0 . In this way, it is hard for an attacker to generate their own keys that will be authenticated. These keychains must be carefully designed and implemented in order to operate with a high degree of certainty that an attacker would never be capable of discovering the true keychain or any keychain that would be authenticated. In Figure 5 , messages =1, → = , are sent and a MAC/key combination is sent in a message afterwards. The MAC is computed using the previous messages shown in Figure 5 and the key, . The key, −1 , is sent so the user can verify the previous MAC, 1: , −1 . Figure 6 shows the algorithm for using TESLA to authenticate messages. If SBAS messages are to be authenticated using the in-phase L5 channel, multiple messages will need to be authenticated at once as the requirements on the system precludes having every message authenticated individually. In this case there are total messages per authentication group and in practice this number can vary from authentication to authentication. Indeed, this number of messages, , will need to be flexible in order to accommodate GNSS fault alert requirements.
The SBAS L5 message has 216 bits available in a single message. SHA256 has an output of 256 bits and so the output of the hash will need to be truncated at each step in the creation of the keychain if the key and MAC are to fit in a single message. Using only a hash function and truncation in the creation of keys provides a deterministic function for deriving the keychain. This characteristic of being deterministic offers receivers the ability to recover the keychain in the event that messages are lost, but it also allows attackers the ability to carry out pre-computation attacks. The addition of a "salt", or cryptographic randomness, to the key creation process has been proposed in previous literature [5] [7] [8] . This salt can come in the form of incorporating a time-varying hash function that changes with each iteration of key creation in the keychain. An example would simply be appending the key with its time of transmission at each key in the keychain before taking the hash and deriving the next key. In order to enable key recovery in the event that a receiver missed messages, these time-varying hash functions need to be deterministic, which is possible for message structures within GPS or Galileo but is not suitable for SBAS. An alternative would be to include a fixed set of bits that are constant with respect to each keychain but are randomly chosen between different keychains so a salt for a future keychain is unpredictable. This salt is appended to each key before it is hashed to find the previous key and the salt would be broadcast and authenticated alongside the root key so that receivers could utilize it once the keychain is in use. If the salt is reasonably large, precomputation attacks on the keychain would be infeasible. Further discussion on this salt will be given in Section IV.
There are several places within this SBAS authentication process that a spoofer might try to attack. One vulnerability is that TESLA requires sufficient time synchronization between the sender and receiver for the signatures to be trusted. Once a key is published, it can be used to create a false MAC verifying false data if the spoofer is able to convince a receiver that they are operating at a time before the current time. An external, trusted source for time, such as the user's clock, must be used to check against the incoming signal time stamps and verify that the time is correct. Clocks drift over time and users will need to periodically sync their clocks to GNSS clocks through a trusted source outside of GNSS. This poses a large challenge for aviation users and will need to be solved before TESLA can be implemented in SBAS.
Other potential vulnerabilities in this authentication process include the asymmetric algorithm that authenticates the root key of the TESLA keychain. If an attacker were able to authenticate a false root key, they would then be able to create a false keychain that receivers would verify and accept. With the advent of quantum computing [6] , many asymmetric algorithms lose their assumed security and so the selection of this asymmetric algorithm will be critical.
The GNSS and SBAS infrastructure are also vulnerable to more conventional cyber-attacks aimed at learning the secret keys and keychains to be used in the future, so care must be taken to protect this information.
The mode of attack this paper will address is an attack on the TESLA keychain itself. With enough resources, an attacker may try to discover the keychain with a brute force attack by guessing final keys and performing the necessary one-way to discover a valid keychain.
III: Probabilistic Attack Model for TESLA security
A standard L5 SBAS message contains 250 bits: a 4-bit preamble, a 6-bit message type identifier, a 216-bit data field, and a 24-bit CRC. The one-way function that is proposed for use in the creation of the TESLA keychain is the SHA256 algorithm. This Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) acts as a standard one-way function in cryptography that is capable of taking an arbitrarily sized bit-field and creating a 256-bit output. This function is deterministic and has no known inverse, making it an ideal candidate for computing the TESLA keychain. The keys in the keychain will be derived from this one-way function by truncating the output of the hash to create each key. In [5] , it was pointed out that one needs to be careful when truncating the output of the SHA256 function to create the keychain. A pre-image or second pre-image becomes more likely to be found as the amount of truncation increases.
The attack is set up as follows: A keychain is created in secret by the SBAS command segment and stored in secret. An attacker has a window of attack where they plan to broadcast a spoofed SBAS signal and change the time or position of a user. The attacker wishes to discover ℓ keys between and +ℓ in order to forge messages and have the user accept these messages as valid. Figure 7 shows this window of attack within the keychain. In this paper, 0 represents the root key and represents the length of the full keychain. The attacker would guess a value ̂+ ℓ , recursively hash and truncate this value ℓ times and check if =̂. If true, the attacker has found a keychain that a receiver would accept and begins to spoof, otherwise the attacker guesses another ̂+ ℓ and tries again. If the attacker begins this method before the release of , computed [̂,̂+ ℓ ] pairs are stored, and a search is performed once is released. Let represent the period of time between message authentications, which will be roughly constant in practice and will be treated as constant here. If a salt is added, preventing the attacker from carrying out a precomputation attack, then the time available for the attacker to find a valid keychain is given in Equation 1.
A probabilistic model was derived in [5] to assess the security of the keychain and a metric known as the probability of a successful attack, , was computed. The probability of success is given in Equation 2 for the case where the keys are generated using a combination of hashes, truncations, and padding.
In this equation, ℎ is the computing power of the attacker expressed in terms of hash/s and is the total number of possible permutations for the set of keys; if keys are n-bits then = 2 . The probability of success against an ideal keychain, where the key generation function is a true one-to-one function without collisions, is given in Equation 3.
As ℓ → ∞, the probability of a successful attack for the non-ideal method becomes dependent upon the hardware and time available to the attacker and the effect of the length of the keychain diminishes with respect to the ideal key creation method. It was shown [5] that for the assumed case where the keys were truncated to 80 bits, a brute force attack using modern computing hardware on the keychain yielded a 10 −4 probability of success. Since then, longer keys have been proposed to be used and this paper will give recommendations to the minimum key length to be used for the TESLA keychain.
The attacker model that was developed in [5] consisted of a malicious actor targeting a specific set of keys within their window of attack. The attacker would know they were successful if their computed keychain reached the same key, , by the time that key was released. The attack occurred under the assumption that a time-varying hash function was used in the creation of the keychain, so an attacker could not carry out a precomputation attack on the keychain. If the attacker is not particular about when they would like to attack, the limiting case for the window of attack is the entire keychain (ℓ = ), shown in Figure 8 . In this case, using the above attack model, the attacker would hash each guess of the final key times until a guessed root key was calculated. Once the keychain begins to be used, an attacker would only have to hash down to the most recently released key to check if their computed keychain is valid, thereby minimizing the total number of hash functions that they would have to perform. This particular strategy will change the probability of success metric and that change is derived as follows. From [5] , the definition of a successful single guess using a brute force attack on the keychain is given as Equation 4 , where is the condition of success for guess , is the index of the disclosed key along the keychain (which may or may not be the root key), ℓ is the length of the keychain the attacker wants to spoof, ̂ is the guessed key at the end of the keychain computed by the attacker, and is the disclosed key.
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For the case of an attack on the entire keychain mentioned above, the success criteria for a single guess is rewritten as Equation 5. The probability of success defined in Equation 2 is predicated on the notion that the attacker will perform key generations (padding → hash → truncation) at each guess for an attack on the full keychain. As the attacker is attempting to brute force attack the keychain, however, keys are continuing to be released. It is not necessarily in the interest of the attacker to find a keychain that arrives at the root key, but to find a keychain that arrives at the most recently released key. If an attacker finds a keychain that arrives at the root key but arrives there through a second pre-image that occurs farther down in the keychain than the most recently released key, the attack is not a successful attack as the receiver would not authenticate this false keychain if they had any recently saved keys in memory. Any key generation computations past the most recently released key is also a waste of time and computing resources. For long keychains, it would be unnecessary to compute large sections of the keychain if they have already been released. Therefore, an attacker would likely listen to the SBAS service and continually update the target key, , to match the most recently released key.
As noted in [5] , if the assumption holds that [ (0, )] ≪ 1/ , the attack is well approximated by its union bound: , where is the interval in seconds between key release. As time moves forward and increases, increases linearly as one would expect when the length of the keychain that must be computed decreases. Since 1 > 1 , the probability of success is still approximated well by its union bound. The average single attempt success probability derived in [5] is given in Equation 9 , and remains true for this new model. where one notices that the time available to attack the keychain is ≤ assuming the attack begins when the root key and salt are released.
As increases, increases logarithmically, and so probability of success converges to the solution given in Equation 2. As a formal exercise, the result found in Equation 12 shows that even with this updated attack model, the benefit to the attacker is linear and not exponential.
The equation for the probability of a successful attack given thus far assumes the use of a time-varying hash function or a salt that serves to add entropy to the key generation process and prevent precomputation attacks. As mentioned previously, for an L1 or L5 authentication message type on an SBAS Ichannel, time-varying hash functions pose a challenge as the rigid message structure associated with systems such as GPS and Galileo is not present. If a receiver comes online after a period of downtime and needs to perform the recursive key generation scheme to recover the TESLA keychain, this process becomes difficult if the keys generated in the intervening time use a hash that is salted with information that cannot be recovered autonomously. SBAS alert messages take precedence which may delay an authentication message, making temporally consistent authentication messages impossible to guarantee.
In the case where there is no keychain salt and a time-independent hash function is used in the generation of the keychain, attackers can use precomputation attacks to discover the keychain long before the keychain is released. The probability of success is then dependent upon the attacker's ability to find a collision on the keychain which is derived in [5] and given as
Where the attack time in Equation 13 is no longer bounded by the length of the keychain as it has been previously. If an attacker is given years to attack the keychain, the probability of computing a valid keychain increases linearly with precomputation time.
IV: TESLA Trade Space
There are several variables that are malleable in the design of the TESLA keychain. Each variable is constrained by limits in bandwidth, security, authentication error rate (AER), receiver effort and other factors crucial to the purpose of SBAS signals. It is important to understand how each of these variables effect these performance parameters and so an analysis is carried out using the mathematical models derived in this and previous works. This work will focus primarily on the affects these variables have on the security of the system. A more detailed analysis incorporating bandwidth and continuity will be done in future work.
The variables that are considered in this work are thought to have the greatest impact on these performance parameters. The number of keys in a keychain ( ) can affect the security of the TESLA scheme along with the length of the keys ( ). Time between authentication (TBA), represented in this paper by the variable , impacts the bandwidth the authentication messages consume in the L5 SBAS signal, affects the AER, and the effort the receiver must exert periodically when authenticating the message. TBA also has implications in the security of the keychain if is chosen independently. The use of a salt in order to prevent precomputation attacks will affect the security of the TESLA keychain as well.
A model for the computational abilities for an attacker is derived using hardware that is specialized in the mining of cryptocurrencies. One of the most productive cryptocurrency mining facility exists in Ordos, China that uses 25,000 machines 24 hours a day [9] . Some of the best machines that are available today run are capable of running at speeds of up to 1.4 ⋅ 10 13 hash/sec [10] . A generous model for the computational ability of an attacker can be estimated at ℎ = 25,000(1.4 ⋅ 10 13 ) hash/sec.
Proper selection of the keychain length and key length should be chosen to make the probability of a successful attack negligible. This threshold is set to 10 −9 for this work and only parameters that render the possibility of a successful attack to this value or lower will be considered. First, the case where a salt is added to the keychain, thereby rendering precomputation attacks infeasible, is considered. Using a TBA of 6 seconds, Figure 9 shows a contour plot of the probabilities of a successful brute force attack on the TESLA keychain with various combinations of key length and keychain length. It is clear from the plot that there is a logarithmic relationship between the keychain length and the probability of a successful attack. Figure 10 uses the same parameters and plots the keychain length logarithmic in time. The data field within the L5 SBAS message is 216 bits long, which will be sufficient to fit the key, MAC and extra bits carrying information about the root key and salt. An attack on forging the MAC itself by guess has a one-time opportunity for success. If successive MACs do not authenticate the data, the receiver will be alerted and will not trust the associated SBAS data. The probability of guessing the correct MAC given in Equation 14 where is the number of bits allocated to the MAC. For the probability of a successful single MAC forgery to be ≤ 10 −9 , the minimum MAC length needs to be is = 30 bits. For a 216-bit data field with a 30-bit MAC, 186 bits remain for the key and other information.
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From Figure 9 and Figure 10 , a key length of 115 bits would be sufficiently secure for the assumed TBA and ℎ for keychains not lasting more than several years. This would leave 71 bits in the L5 message for extra information that could be used for over-the-air rekeying (OTAR), salt information and root key information.
The above figures assume there is salt added to the keychain preventing pre-computation attacks. Figure  11 below shows the equivalent plot of Figure 10 , assuming the attacker performs a precomputation attack lasting 30 years with a TBA of 6 seconds. The probability of success is not a function of the keychain length if the attacker is able to precompute a keychain, and in this case a 115-bit key leads to a probability of success slightly under 10 −8 . The effects of the chosen TBA and assumed computing power ( ℎ ) of the adversary are shown in Figure  12 and Figure 13 , respectively. In Figure 12 , a TBA = 1s refers to a key/MAC message existing on the quadrature channel and in Figure 13 , an ℎ = 350000 Thash/s is equivalent to the attackers computing capabilities assumed throughout the rest of the paper. These plots show isolines for = 10 −9 for varying key and keychain lengths as TBA and ℎ are changed.
Due to the exponential effect the key length has, for fixed keychain lengths both the TBA and ℎ change the key length by several bits. In this way, the risk of being too conservative in the key length has a limited effect on the bandwidth of the L5 SBAS message.
V: Conclusions and Recommendations
A model for the security of the TESLA keychain that was derived in an earlier paper [5] was modified to accommodate a new form of attack. A security-based trade analysis was carried out to look at the role different variables played in the effectiveness of the TESLA keychain. The data field for an L5 SBAS message is 216 bits that will include a MAC, key, and other authentication information, bandwidth permitting.
Contour plots where created looking at the effect that key and keychain length combinations had on the security of the keychain. The security of the keychain scales exponentially with linear increases in the key length. The addition of salt proved to be a robust method to prevent precomputation attacks on the keychain. If a 30-bit salt is used, an attacker would have a = 10 −9 of correctly guessing a future salt, similar to the length of the MAC.
To look at the consequence that time between authentication and computational ability played on the security of the keychain, plots containing iso-lines were created to illustrate the magnitude of the change each variable had on the security. In both cases, large changes in the independent variable only resulted in small changes in the required key lengths, giving confidence that if a system is designed with sufficient margin in the key length, the security of the keychain increases exponentially.
From this work, for keychains lasting less that 1 year in duration, 115-bit keys may be sufficient for security against an attacker with the above assumed capabilities. For an added precaution, 125 bits adds an decreases the probability of a successful attack by nearly three orders of magnitude at minimal cost to the data-field. If a 30-bit MAC is used, 61 bits are then left in the data field to be used for other authentication information. These may include information on the authentication of the root key, key updates, key revocation, salt, and other necessary information.
For future work, impact of these parameters on bandwidth and continuity will need to be calculated. While observing the security of the keychain will give a lower bound on the length of the key and keychain, the bandwidth and continuity are likely to give an upper bound to these variables in the system as well as help narrow down other variables such as TBA. The asymmetric algorithm used to authenticate the root key will need to be chosen. This has proven to be a more difficult task, as the threat of quantum computing negates the use of many popular, standardized algorithms. Moreover, standardized algorithms that are resistant to quantum computing are not expected to be available until well into the next decade. Finally, the guarantee of sufficient time synchronization between the sender and receiver is a technical problem that is likely to be the largest hurdle before a secure implementation of TESLA on SBAS. This problem in particular will need to be solved before any implementation of the system can be deemed secure.
